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Introduction
The popular uprisings in the EU’s Southern 
neighbourhood in early 2011 and election violence 
in Belarus in December 2010 tested the EU’s policy 
towards non-democratic regimes and those in the 
grey zone between democracy and autocracy.1 The 
potential of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) to promote democracy, human rights, 
and the rule of law in Eastern Europe has so far 
mainly been analysed by the example of most 
likely cases, Ukraine and Moldova being the most 
prominent ones in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood 
(Solonenko 2010; Wichmann 2010; Gawrich et al. 
2009; Freyburg et al. 2009). By analysing the EU’s 
policy towards Azerbaijan, this paper contributes 
to the debate about the EU’s engagement with 
authoritarian regimes in its Eastern neighbourhood 
and thus the study of least likely cases. 
Azerbaijan’s democratic performance2 and its 
possession of large amounts of energy resources 
make it an especially interesting case. While it is 
included in the ENP3 and the Eastern Partnership 
(EaP)4, the EU’s energy-related interests5 
1 For more on the notion of ‘hybrid regimes’ see for instance 
Morlino 2008. 
2 The Freedom House Index, which combines political rights and 
civil liberties, rated Azerbaijan as “partly free” between 1997 
and 2003 and as “not free” from 2004 to 2010. Comparative and 
historical data of the Freedom House Index is available at: http://
www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439, accessed 10 
January 2011. The Freedom House Country Report for Azerbaijan 
(2010) is available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cf
m?page=22&year=2010&country=7775, accessed 10 January 
2011. 
3 Since 2004, the European  Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is the 
framework for the EU’s relations with its eastern and southern 
neighbours. In 2005, after the ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia and 
due to an increasing awareness of the frozen conflicts (concerning 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh) in the region, all 
three countries of the Southern Caucasus – Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia – were included in the ENP.
4 The Eastern Partnership is a policy framework which was agreed 
upon by the 27 EU member states and the six Eastern neighbours 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine 
on 7 May, 2009 in Prague. It includes bilateral and multilateral 
instruments to open up a new phase in the relations between the 
EU its Eastern neighbours.
5 Cooperation in the energy sector includes a partnership on 
energy, signed in 2006. The “Memorandum of understanding 
on a strategic partnership between the European Union and the 
Republic of Azerbaijan in the field of energy” is available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/international/international_cooperation/
doc/mou_azerbaijan_en.pdf, accessed 1 December 2010. In 
early 2011, a joint declaration on the southern gas corridor 
has been signed. See “Joint Declaration on the Southern Gas 
Corridor”, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/
in Azerbaijan seem to present an important 
difference compared to its relations with the other 
ENP countries. The importance that the EU is, and 
should be, attaching to these interests is assessed 
differently by scholars and experts. Whereas some 
stress that Azerbaijan’s energy resources are of 
strategic importance for the West and cooperation 
in the sector should be strengthened (Meister 
2010), others criticise the EU’s energy policy 
for de facto keeping a non-democratic regime 
alive (Jobelius 2010: 5). Instead of exclusively 
focusing cooperation on the energy resources 
of the country, it is argued that the West should 
make energy imports conditional upon democratic 
reform (Askarov 2010: 9). The ‘uniqueness’ 
of this energy-rich country not only affects the 
EU’s policy but also the demand for cooperation 
on the part of national elites. High oil revenues, 
coupled with the growing self-confidence of the 
political elites in Azerbaijan and resistance to 
influence from the West, reduce the potential for 
transformation and democratic reform and thus 
have implications for the achievement of EU 
foreign policy goals set by the ENP and the EaP. 
It may be argued that states which are not 
dependent on the EU for security or trade-
related reasons have little to no ambition to make 
the EU’s normative ideas their own (Bendiek 
2008). Instead of analysing Azerbaijan’s (non-) 
compliance with policy propositions and 
norms promoted by the EU, this paper focuses 
instead on the EU’s normative agenda. Based 
on the argument that international actors and 
organisations tend to spread their own type 
of system in order to be able to cooperate with 
actors with similar value patterns (Essouso 
2008: 34), it is generally assumed that the EU’s 
foreign policy follows internal value patterns and 
transfers these to its external dimension. This 
paper critically analyses to what extent the EU’s 
normative agenda is pursued and implemented in 
the case of Azerbaijan. Special emphasis is given 
to views and attitudes of EU officials involved in 
the implementation of the ENP in Azerbaijan. 
strategy/doc/2011_01_13_joint_declaration_southern_corridor.
pdf, accessed 1 March 2011; see also “Barroso tops Azeri gas 
deal with visa facilitation.”, available at: http://www.euractiv.
com/en/energy/barroso-tops-azeri-gas-deal-visa-facilitation-
news-501255, accessed 23 January 2011.
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An additional and related aspect concerns 
potential reform partners of the EU, who are able 
to advocate democratic reforms. In countries 
where domestic structures decrease the likeliness 
of reforms (e.g. political elites as veto-players, 
weak political opposition), supporters of policy 
change have to be found outside of power 
structures, notably in civil society. Several 
scholars argue that external actors are more 
successful in triggering democratic change if 
they cooperate with reform-minded domestic 
actors that agree with their political objectives 
and interests (Magen/Morlino 2009: 43-44; 
Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005). This paper 
analyses whether the EU sees the potential of 
civil society as a reform partner and whether it 
can count on its support.6 
Focusing on both the implementation of the 
EU’s normative agenda and possible reform 
partners, the paper finds answers to the following 
research questions: (1) Does the implementation 
of the ENP in Azerbaijan match its formulation? 
(2) How do ENP goals and their implementation 
resonate in Azerbaijan, notably in civil society? 
The paper argues that in Azerbaijan the EU 
pursues the ENP goals only partially and 
implements them inconsistently. The lack of a 
comprehensive civil society inclusion is a case in 
point. 
In the first part of the paper the goals and 
rationale of the ENP – as revealed by official 
documents issued in the formulation phase of 
the ENP – are reviewed. Special emphasis is 
placed on the EU’s conceptualisation of civil 
society within the framework of the ENP. 
Second, the means by which EU actors working 
in Azerbaijan engage in the implementation of 
6 In total, 14 semi-structured interviews were conducted in Baku 
in June 2010 with employees of the Delegation of the European 
Union to Azerbaijan, other actors of the international donor 
community, civil servants of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as with leaders of seven 
civil society organisations in Azerbaijan. In order to collect 
diverse viewpoints, representatives of civil society organisations 
with different foci (i.e. human rights, legal support, media and 
umbrella activities) and funding sources (i.e. mainly funded by 
the EU, other international donors, the Council of State Support 
to Non-Governmental Organizations under the President of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan and/or other small-scale local donors) 
were interviewed.
the ENP are discussed. The extent to which they 
pursue the ENP goals and how they assess the 
role of civil society in both the implementation 
of the ENP and Azerbaijan’s democratisation 
process is analysed. Third, the paper focuses 
on the perceptions of civil society actors in 
order to understand whether the EU is able to 
communicate its goals to civil society as both a 
target group and a potential agent of change in 
Azerbaijan.
SPES Policy Papers 2011
9
I	 The	official	discourse
This chapter identifies the general goals and 
rationale of the ENP, as revealed by official 
documents, before tracing the EU’s attempts to 
improve this policy and achieve its main goals by 
including local actors other than political elites, 
notably civil society. Finally, specific instruments 
are analysed in order to determine what role they 
foresee for civil society in the Eastern partner 
countries in general, and Azerbaijan in particular. 
The ENP: general policy goals including the 
role of values
Since European leaders informally discussed 
the creation of a new neighbourhood initiative – 
later called ENP – that should echo the success 
of enlargement policy in 2002, they have 
continued to stress that the aim of this new policy 
framework should be to “promote stability and 
prosperity within and beyond the new borders” 
while circumventing the emergence of “new 
dividing lines in Europe” (European Commission 
2003). After the official inception of the ENP in 
2004, the European Commission specified that 
the overarching goals of this policy consist in 
strengthening “stability, security and well-being 
for all concerned” (European Commission 2004a). 
The ENP is also about the EU’s own security-
related interests. Notably, the inclusion of the 
three South Caucasian states in the ENP in 2005 
proved the EU’s increasing attention to the frozen 
conflicts in the region and related concerns for 
its own security (European Parliament 2003a, 
b; Wolczuk 2003). For instance, in 2006 the 
European Commission argued that a more 
proactive engagement in conflict management in 
the Southern Caucasus is necessary as the frozen 
conflicts may produce “major spillovers for 
the EU, such as illegal immigration, unreliable 
energy supplies, environmental degradation and 
terrorism” (European Commission 2006a: 2). 
From the very beginning it has also been 
repeatedly stated that the neighbourhood policy is 
based on shared values (GAERC 2007; European 
Commission 2004; European Commission 2003; 
Council of the European Union 2003). The 
political values to be projected beyond the EU’s 
borders include the rule of law, democracy and 
human rights, as well as good governance. In line 
with the assumption that the EU seeks to project 
its own conceptual foundations and identity as 
a value-based actor to its external dimension, 
scholars have agreed that the ENP is one of the 
EU’s most obvious attempts to do so (Börzel/
Risse 2009; Magen 2006; Kelley 2006). Indeed, 
in the official documents the goals of the ENP are 
explicitly traced back to the EU.7 More concretely, 
the ENP seems to be built on the assumption that 
democratic reforms and the respect for human 
rights and the rule of law will bring security, 
stability, and peace to the neighbouring countries, 
as was the case for those states that founded and 
joined the EU. As Magen puts it, the ENP holds 
“European integration itself to be the source of 
regional security” (Magen 2006: 401). 
The promotion of values beyond the EU’s 
borders, as described above, is not a unique feature 
of the ENP. While it is not surprising that the EaP, 
aimed at strengthening the relations between 
the EU and its Eastern neighbours, pursues 
very similar objectives (European Commission 
2008a), the EU has replicated and standardised 
policy goals and instruments to a wide range 
of policy frameworks across the entire globe 
(Börzel/Risse 2009: 24). This “one size fits all” 
approach (Börzel/Pamuk/Stahn 2009) seems to 
leave little space for different values and practices 
in countries that are far from Western democratic 
statehood. The key word differentiation, however, 
appeared in official EU documents recently. The 
EU seeks to achieve the above-mentioned policy 
goals by means of a “country-specific approach” 
(European Commission 2007a), “performance-
driven” and “tailor-made assistance” (Council 
of the European Union 2007), and a “more for 
more” approach (European Commission 2007a: 
2). It remains to be seen whether the notion 
of differentiation is consistently employed in 
practice. A question that is especially interesting 
in the case of Azerbaijan is how exactly local 
7 Several examples illustrate this point: “security and prosperity 
of the EU, partners and indeed the entire continent” (European 
Commission 2008: 2; authors´ italics); values “as set out within the 
EU in the Charter of fundamental rights” (European Commission 
2003: 4; authors´ italics).
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practices and values are taken into consideration 
and to what extent the ambition of the EU towards 
the Eastern partners is made conditional upon the 
respect for values. 
Civil society: an agent of EU foreign policy? 
In 2006, two years after the inception of the 
ENP and the year in which the first progress 
reports showed its limited impact on the 
transformation of the EU’s Eastern neighbours, 
the EU institutions recognised that cooperation 
with governments was not sufficient to achieve 
the EU’s ambitious goals. Several official 
documents, starting with a Non-paper issued by 
the European Commission in December 2006 
(European Commission 2006b), highlighted the 
need to involve actors other than political elites 
to ensure the success of the ENP (Council of the 
European Union 2008a; GAERC 2007; European 
Commission 2006a). Although they were not 
included in the formulation phase of the ENP 
(Böttger 2010: 117), it was emphasised that civil 
society actors are crucial to implement the policy. 
Civil society actors should become stakeholders 
in the entire reform process, i.e. the preparation 
of legislation, the promotion and monitoring of 
the implementation of the ENP Action Plans, as 
well as the development of national and regional 
initiatives (European Commission 2007a; 
European Commission 2006a). Moreover, civil 
society’s potential to defend human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, which makes it a key agent 
in the democratisation processes, was recognised 
(European Commission 2006b). Special emphasis 
was given to the promotion of “shared principles 
and values” that may be facilitated by civil society 
(Council of the European Union 2008a). Finally, 
it was recognised that a positive understanding 
of the EU and its policies in the region is a 
pre-condition for their success. In this regard, 
civil society was assigned the role of a promoter 
of EU visibility (Council of the European Union 
2008a; European Commission 2006b).8 
The EaP Civil Society Forum (CSF), the first 
institutionalised attempt to empower Eastern 
8 Moreover, civil society is described as an important actor in 
sectoral policies and in conflict resolution. Although the latter 
could be (controversially) discussed in the case of Azerbaijan, it 
is less relevant for the topic analysed and thus neglected here. 
European civil society9 by facilitating dialogue 
between civil society and political elites and 
encouraging networking among civil society 
organisations (CSOs) of the EaP partner countries 
and the EU10, mirrors these assigned roles. Civil 
society is described as an implementing partner 
and a key to the success of the EaP, as promoter 
of the EU’s value based policy goals and EU 
visibility (European Commission 2009; Ferrero-
Waldner 2009).11 Some of the EU member states 
also attach great importance to the CSF. For 
instance, representatives of the German Federal 
Foreign Office, which hosted the second CSF 
meeting in November 2010, state that especially 
in the countries where human rights and 
democratisation are (most) at risk, i.e. Belarus 
and Azerbaijan, cooperation with civil society 
is crucial. In their view, the forum can serve as 
an indicator for the openness of the political 
system (i.e. by asking whether the unimpeded 
participation of civil society actors is possible12). 
Moreover, by carrying out this cooperation with 
civil society in the public sphere, the governments 
in the partner countries may, according to German 
officials, learn that restrictions of political 
freedoms are costly.13 
Given that all three of the recurring assigned 
roles (civil society as implementing partner, and 
promoter of common values and EU visibility) 
relate to the EU and the achievement of the 
goals of its neighbourhood policies, civil society 
is mainly conceptualised as an agent of EU 
foreign policy. Although, as revealed by official 
documents, the EU admits that civil societies in 
its neighbourhood face certain problems, e.g. 
a defective relationship with the government, 
or practical difficulties such as limited access 
9 Similar attempts have been made in the Southern dimension of 
the ENP (Jünemann 2003).
10 The Homepage of the CSF gives more concrete information: 
http://www.eap-csf.eu/, accessed 1 March 2011.
11 In addition, civil society organisations “will benefit from 
implementation of Pilot Regional Development and cross-border 
cooperation programme, and specific Culture Programme and 
opening of Youth in Action programme” (European Commission 
2009). 
12 The Belarusian case shows, however, that participation and good 
performance of civil society representatives in the CSF do not 
necessarily result from an open political system.   
13 Interview with civil servants in the Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, 
August 2010. 
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to information or weak capacities (European 
Commission 2006c), the detected weaknesses do 
not differentiate between individual countries and 
their complex and diverse realities. Moreover, 
these weaknesses are not expressed as real 
impediments for the realisation of the EU goals 
to be achieved with the aid of civil society. It 
remains to be seen whether civil society is able to 
realise the ambitions voiced by the EU. 
Taking a closer look: civil societies’ role as 
formulated in implementation instruments 
The EU has several instruments at its disposal, 
which take into consideration civil society. These 
range from geographic programmes such as 
the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI), including the programming 
documents National Indicative Programmes 
(NIP), to thematic programmes such as the 
European Non-state Actors and Local Authorities 
Thematic Programme (NSA-LA) and the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR).14 The implementing agency for 
all projects is EuropeAid.15 We expect that the 
limited regional scope of a programme results 
in a higher degree of differentiation, i.e. a better 
consideration of local conditions and a clearer 
picture on the abilities and real performance 
of civil society. For the thematic programmes 
which are not geared towards a specific region 
but implemented via worldwide calls, we assume 
instead that the EU uses a ‘one size fits all 
approach’ resulting in a more general definition 
of the tasks and role of civil society. The analysis 
of both categories of programmes, however, 
reveals that they are not substantially different 
in terms of content. A slight difference can be 
seen in the fact that the geographic programmes 
seem to structure the identified general and 
14 For the allocation of funds under the diverse programmes 
for civil society purposes in the period 2007-2009 see Kaca/
Kazmierkiewicz 2010: 8-12.
15 EuropeAid was set up in 2001 to improve the implementation of 
EU projects. Its establishment led to devolution, i.e. a far-reaching 
form of administrative decentralisation, of responsibilities and 
increased the importance of the EU Delegations in the recipient 
countries (Raik 2006: 20). Since January 2011, the newly created 
Directorate-General Europe-Aid Development and Cooperation 
combines the former DG Development and DG Europe Aid. For 
more information see http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/who/about/
index_en.htm, accessed 1 February 2011.
specific objectives, expected results and possible 
indicators of achievement more clearly than 
thematic programmes. 
The concept of civil society as an agent of 
EU foreign policy continues to resonate in both 
types of programmes. They focus on civil society 
as an implementing partner mostly in the form 
of a consultant. Both EIDHR and ENPI stress 
the need to consult with representatives of civil 
society, as well as other donors and actors, as 
early in the programming process as possible in 
order to facilitate their respective contributions 
and to ensure that assistance activities are as 
complementary as possible (Official Journal 
of the European Union 2006). In addition, civil 
society should also be included in the monitoring 
process (European Commission 2006g). In 
the case of Azerbaijan, the EU identifies the 
promotion of human rights and democratic 
reform as fields in which civil society needs 
to be included as an implementing partner for 
EU guidelines and allocated financial support 
(European Commission 2007b: 5). An additional 
example of the role civil society can play vis-
à-vis the government lies in the development 
and implementation of environmental policy 
(European Commission 2006d: 15). 
However, civil society is not only described 
as an agent of EU policy but also as an agent 
of democratisation from inside. It is generally 
stated that democracy has to be seen as a 
process, developing from within (Official 
Journal of the European Union 2006). Civil 
society organisations are said to play a key 
role in the promotion of democracy and 
human rights (European Commission 2010b). 
An indicator of initial achievements in this 
regard is the increased number of consultations 
of civil society in human rights legislation 
(European Commission 2006g). But in the case 
of Azerbaijan, it is recognised that civil society 
itself needs to grow further in order “to ensure a 
truly pluralistic and democratic development of 
the country” (European Commission 2005d: 9).16 
16 Interestingly, the EU describes Azerbaijan’s state of democracy 
and the objectives of its democratisation process very positively. 
This indicates how marginal a role democratisation plays in the 
EU’s overall policy towards Azerbaijan (Beichelt 2007: 14). 
Not surprisingly, the over-optimistic language used by the EU 
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Compared to the first years of cooperation, 
where EU assistance towards Azerbaijan has 
been rather state-centred (Börzel/Pamuk/Stahn 
2009), an increasing reference to civil society 
in programming documents since 2004, and 
even more so since 2006, reflects the growing 
importance the EU is attaching to this issue (Kaca/
Kaźmierkiewicz 2010: 4). The comparison of the 
ENP country report and action plan for Azerbaijan 
with those for the other Eastern Partnership 
countries reveals, however, that civil society is not 
systematically mentioned as a priority per se, or 
as relevant for a certain number of policy fields. 
Instead, civil society seems to be interspersed 
haphazardly. For example, while civil society 
is seen as an important actor in the fight against 
corruption in Azerbaijan, it is not mentioned in 
this role in the case of Armenia or Moldova, even 
though civil society in Moldova is considered 
much stronger (with 2700 organisations) than 
in Azerbaijan (with 1500 organisations), and 
corruption is considered equally problematic 
(European Commission 2006e, f, European 
Commission 2005a, b, c, European Commission 
2004b). Moreover, civil society is equated with 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). A clear 
definition of civil society or consideration of 
the particular features of externally funded civil 
societies cannot be found. There is recognition, 
however, of the fact that civil society in Azerbaijan 
is especially encumbered by difficult procedures 
for NGO registration (European Commission 
2006e: 4). Given the lack of clear rules on how 
consultation and inclusion of civil society in the 
reform process should be undertaken, the shift 
towards the use of transnational channels in the 
EU’s engagement appears to be tentative. It can 
therefore be seen as a starting point but not yet as 
a systematic achievement.
This chapter has explored the goals and 
rationale of the ENP with a special focus on 
the role of values, and analysed the EU’s 
understanding of civil society. The ambitious 
idea of considering civil society as an important 
is mirrored by the official discourse in Azerbaijan according to 
which the government puts special emphasis on civil society, 
which is said to be a key element of a functioning democracy 
(Interview by authors with civil servants in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Baku, June 2010). 
actor that can contribute to ensuring the success 
of the ENP, coupled with the lack of a more 
concrete understanding of civil society based on 
the country-specific conditions, give rise to two 
questions. First, is the EU doing what it professes, 
i.e. empowering civil society by systematically 
including it in political processes, even against 
the will of governments? Second, is civil society 
able and willing to play the roles assigned to it by 
the EU‘s official discourse or is the instrumental 
character of this inclusion (agent of EU policy) 
perceived negatively? Answers depend on the 
goals and capacities of civil society as well as 
on the role of political elites in constraining and 
gate-keeping external assistance to civil society. 
The following chapter explores how the EU takes 
these factors into account when implementing the 
ENP. At the same time, it clarifies to what extent 
the ambitious discourse within the EU determines 
the implementation of civil society assistance in 
the ENP framework. 
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II The EU in Azerbaijan: civil so-
ciety assistance as a tightrope walk 
for the EU
Looking beyond formal documents, this chapter 
analyses the views, attitudes, and strategies of 
EU officials working in the Delegation of the 
European Union to Azerbaijan.17 We assume that 
EU actors’ knowledge about political, economic 
and cultural conditions in Azerbaijan contributes 
to the development of a tailor-made approach 
towards civil society, as advocated in official 
documents. Thus, we expect that they will actively 
support the adaptation of general ENP goals to the 
political situation and the abilities of civil society. 
But to what extent do EU officials working in 
Azerbaijan actually refer to (i.e. adopt, transform, 
dilute, challenge) policy goals as expressed in the 
formulation phase of the ENP? How do they assess 
the role of civil society in the implementation 
of the ENP and in Azerbaijan’s democratisation 
process? 
The political relations between the EU and 
Azerbaijan as seen by the political actors 
involved
When asked about the EU’s goals in its relations 
with Azerbaijan, the EU officials highlight three 
interlinked issues that allow conclusions to be drawn 
about the EU‘s policy priorities and the perception 
of its room to manoeuvre. First, the respondents 
argue that the EU aims to broaden and deepen 
the relationship with Azerbaijan in the existing 
political frameworks, the government being by 
necessity its most important cooperation partner. 
The negotiation of an Association Agreement, 
launched in 2010, is seen by the EU officials as an 
important milestone for the relationship and a task 
for the coming years. They consider the rule of 
law and the transition to a market economy as the 
most important elements and achievable goals of 
this agreement. Second, cooperation in the energy 
17 Until 2008, the only EU presence in Azerbaijan was a technical 
office. Since 2009, tasks have been taken over from the 
Commission Headquarters in Brussels, the staff is growing rapidly 
and today the EU is represented by a fully-fledged Delegation 
of the European Union. Information about the Delegation is 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/azerbaijan/index_
en.htm, accessed 1 March 2011.  
sector receives prominent mention. Although 
recognising that the ENP and the EaP do not focus 
exclusively on energy issues, the EU officials give 
special importance to this topic. In their view, the 
EU needs to reduce its dependence on Russian 
gas and consequently encourages Azerbaijan to 
intensify cooperation in the energy sector. Since 
this requires good relations with the government, 
the ‘energy factor’ has, as will be shown below, 
implications for the implementation of the ENP, 
notably in those areas where the government is most 
reluctant to pass reforms. Third, the respondents 
consider the EU’s policy towards Azerbaijan 
in the area of human rights and democracy as 
delayed compared to its neighbours Armenia and 
Georgia. The Human Rights Dialogue between 
the EU and Azerbaijan that was agreed upon in 
2008 was, for instance, only reluctantly accepted 
by the political leadership, which was merely 
interested in discussing migration issues. Whereas 
the respondents do not clearly formulate short and 
long-term goals for the democratic development of 
the country, and thus do not mirror the ambitious 
and over-optimistic official discourse, they 
interestingly observe that the political elites in 
Azerbaijan are sensitive to the development of the 
EU’s relations with Armenia and Georgia. As they 
put it, political leaders do not want Azerbaijan to 
be a laggard and they are more likely to accept EU 
decisions in the area of human rights if the EU has 
acted similarly towards neighbouring countries.18 
Whereas the EU actors are aware of this tendency, 
they do not seem to use it to the EU’s advantage 
by openly promoting competition among the ENP 
partner countries. 
A mixed approach, which combines reminding 
the government of facts and encouraging positive 
developments, is viewed by EU officials as 
the best solution. The latest Progress Report 
(European Commission 2010a) is considered a 
successful political move. Although the report was 
generally positive, it contained enough criticism 
to ensure that it was received with some irritation 
by the government. At the same time, however, 
18 The fear of falling behind neighbours or competitors can become 
an indirect push factor towards policy change even without direct 
external pressure (Börzel/Risse 2009; Dolowitz/Marsh 1996: 
349).  
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EU officials do not consider further antagonism as 
appropriate or constructive.
EU officials’ views on the relations towards 
Azerbaijan show that they perceive different 
degrees of willingness by the government to 
cooperate with the EU. While reforms and 
intensified cooperation in the energy and 
economic sectors are assessed as realistic 
goals for the future, progress in the dialogue on 
human rights and democracy is seen as meeting 
more resistance from the political leadership. 
The reluctance of political elites to undertake 
democratic reforms suggests that civil society has 
to act in an unfavourable environment, an issue 
that will be analysed in the following. 
Civil society as a weak implementing partner 
Involving civil society in the ENP reform process 
with the aim of meeting the goals defined in the 
strategic documents is one objective expressed by 
the EU in its official discourse. This would mean 
giving civil society actors access to, and rights in, 
different political processes, e.g. in the preparation 
of laws, the monitoring of the implementation of 
ENP Action Plans, and consultation in the drafting 
process of Progress Reports by the European 
Commission. 
According to officials of the EU Delegation 
in Baku, there are, however, two main reasons 
that have hindered civil society from playing 
such a role. First, large sections of civil society in 
Azerbaijan are not well connected to the political 
elites and thus, are not involved in political 
decision-making. Out of 5,000-6,000 officially 
registered NGOs19 in Azerbaijan only around 20 
are said to be active in challenging governmental 
decisions. Second, the link between civil society 
and the broader public is almost nonexistent. 
According to the interviewees, society at large 
does not understand the concept of civil society, 
its role, or its objectives. This assessment is 
strengthened by a sociological survey conducted in 
Azerbaijan between 2003 and 2008, according to 
which trust in NGOs and trade unions is very low. 
19 Figures named by interview partners. Differences in estimates 
concerning civil society (see page 12) and NGOs are due to 
variation in definition by sources. According to USAID, NGO and 
government figures for the precise number of registered NGOs 
vary between 2,600 and 3,200 (USAID 2010). 
In contrast, the population displays a high level 
of trust in the President, who can consolidate his 
power (Musabayov/Shulman 2009, 2008, 2006, 
2005).20 Not in demand by the society at large, the 
NGO sector in Azerbaijan resembles, according 
to EU officials, a business that is artificially kept 
alive by its own founders and members.  
These missing links between civil society and 
both the political elite and the broader public is not 
unique to Azerbaijan, but has also been detected 
in other post-Soviet countries (Solonenko 2010; 
Stewart 2008; Raik 2006). The phenomenon of 
loose groupings of civil society activists without 
broader societal backing and close ties to the 
political leadership, it is argued, is to be explained 
by the Communist legacy. The exclusive 
provision of financial assistance for the most 
active parts of civil society by external sources is 
considered to contribute to the persistence of the 
problem (Solonenko 2010; Stewart 2009). The 
situation of civil society in Azerbaijan, however, 
is particularly difficult because of both limited 
opportunity structures inside the country that 
might encourage political mobilisation and the 
lack of emphasis placed on democracy promotion 
by external actors (Gahramanova 2009). 
As a result of this view on the existing 
weaknesses of the civil society sector, both the 
potential role of civil society in the reform process 
of Azerbaijan and the opportunities offered by 
cooperation between the EU and civil society 
are not viewed optimistically by EU actors in 
Azerbaijan. Mirroring the roles assigned in the 
official discourse, the respondents implicitly 
differentiated between civil society as an 
implementing partner (and thus an agent of EU 
foreign policy) and an agent of democratisation 
from inside. Although grass-roots initiatives 
with missions that are not directly related to EU 
policies were seen as important in principle, 
their impact in Azerbaijan was considered 
critically given the reluctance of the government. 
In contrast, involving civil society in political 
processes related to ENP and EaP was assessed 
as particularly meaningful, and the support of 
civil society as an implementing partner of the 
20 See also the opinion poll on public opinion in Azerbaijan on the political 
system (The Caucasus Research Resource Center 2011: 17-20). 
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EU was equated with an indirect empowerment. 
In this regard, the respondents argued that they 
seek to play a mediating role by giving NGOs a 
say and transmitting their demands and claims to 
the government. However, making this triangle 
between government, civil society and the EU 
work was considered a highly difficult task. In 
this regard, scholars and experts criticise the EU’s 
tendency to include civil society unsystematically 
and not against the will of national elites (Barbé/
Johansson-Noguès 2008; Alieva 2006: 17). 
The EaP Civil Society Forum goal of a more 
systematic inclusion of civil society in the reform 
process could remedy this problem in the long 
run. Interestingly, the positive value of this forum 
was not expressed by the EU officials interviewed. 
Engagement in supporting the national platform 
remained vague and seemed to be financially 
constrained.
EU officials see the potential of including 
civil society in the political process; however 
its realisation is considered difficult due to the 
structural deficiencies of civil society. Although 
the concept of civil society as an implementing 
partner is used, it remains unclear. A constructive 
outlook on how to improve civil society’s abilities 
and make it a stronger reform partner in the future 
is missing. 
Civil society as an (unpleasant) promoter of 
European values and principles?
The Azerbaijani government has (at least on 
paper) committed itself to certain values and 
principles in its relations with the EU by signing 
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA) and the Action Plan. Theoretically, civil 
society can use these commitments as political 
leverage in its quest for reforms and the respect 
of fundamental values (Solonenko 2010: 13). As 
seen in the previous chapter, the EU in its official 
documents does encourage civil society to act as a 
promoter of European values and principles. EU 
officials in Azerbaijan, however, only partially 
subscribe to this idea. On the one hand, they argue 
that by funding NGOs that promote fundamental 
values (mainly human rights NGOs), the EU 
shows that it cares about more than just gas and oil 
in Azerbaijan. On the other hand, they relativise 
harsh governmental reactions to civil society 
protests by qualifying the disrespect of human 
rights and personal freedoms in Azerbaijan as 
unsystematic. 
Nevertheless, the EU has a concrete 
mechanism at its disposal to promote human 
rights in Azerbaijan. Several documents repeat the 
EU’s general commitment to human rights and the 
support of human rights defenders (Council of the 
European Union 2008b; Council of the European 
Union 2006; Official Journal of the European 
Union 2006). Being identified as important 
actors and the “primary interface” (Council of 
the European Union 2008b) between the EU and 
human rights activists, the EU Delegations can 
become active in different ways, from sharing 
information about the human rights situation, 
keeping in contact with human rights defenders 
and sustaining a dialogue about human rights with 
the national government, to conducting actions to 
protect those activists who are under immediate 
political pressure (Council of the European Union 
2008b). EU officials in Azerbaijan consider this 
mechanism principally successful. However, 
they acknowledge the need to disseminate 
further knowledge about it throughout the region, 
especially to the broader public, in order to 
strengthen its impact and to spread knowledge 
about individual rights, human rights activists and 
the EU’s efforts to protect them. Being conscious 
that non-visibility limits the impact of EU efforts, 
they do not seem to have a strategic vision on 
how to improve visibility. Neither do they have 
concrete ideas on how to build on civil society as 
active promoters of human rights and advocates 
for EU actions in this area. Interestingly, the 
respondents stress that the EU seeks to ensure a 
“minimum level of human rights” in Azerbaijan. 
Compared to official documents this assessment 
proves a much more modest view of what is 
achievable in Azerbaijan. 
The results of the interviews suggest that 
the EU performs a balancing act between 
maintaining good relations with the government 
and advocating for human rights and democratic 
reforms in Azerbaijan. In this context, parts of 
civil society active in this field are not considered 
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as important change agents. Instead, they are 
blamed for supporting extreme positions and are 
thus beginning to lose credibility. 
Operational aspects: empowering civil society 
through funding?
Taking into account current difficulties in including 
civil society in political processes, financial 
assistance may be the most important means by 
which the EU can develop the potential of civil 
society in Azerbaijan. However, as shown below, 
the distribution of funds coupled with funding 
practices make the EU appear a grant-giver and 
technical administrator with potential but limited 
eagerness to improve its performance. 
A look at the actual financial allocations for 
civil society organisations in Azerbaijan21 reveals 
that the bulk of money is spent on projects focusing 
on social issues (e.g. disabled children, poverty 
reduction, education, youth), whereas projects in 
the proper area of human rights and democracy 
as well as in the capacity development of NGOs 
are neglected. This funding reality underpins the 
EU’s fear that – in contrast to societal projects 
– the implementation of more political projects 
may negatively impact its relations with the 
government, the latter being adverse to influence 
from outside. At the same time, the EU’s aim (as 
formulated in official documents) to make civil 
society an implementing partner in the ENP is 
mirrored only partly by the financial allocations.22
Regarding the potential recipients of EU 
funds, two main problems are emphasised by 
the EU officials. First, a general lack of human 
resources (i.e. no competent and well-trained 
personnel) in civil society organisations results in 
difficulties in qualifying for EU funds. Moreover, 
a low level of English knowledge often clashes 
with EU application procedures, which EU 
actors describe as complex and bureaucratic. The 
respondents consider this situation problematic 
and acknowledge that no application training has 
so far been offered to civil society organisations 
by the EU Delegation. However, with a view to 
21 A detailed list with all projects funded by the different EU 
instruments was provided by the EU Delegation. 
22 Interestingly, an emphasis on projects focusing on social issues 
has also been detected as regards the other ENP countries (Kaca/
Kazmierkiewicz 2010).
the limited human resources in the Delegation, an 
improvement in the situation cannot be expected 
either. In contrast, a ‘learning by doing’ approach 
for civil society in the application process has 
been promoted, with those NGOs reluctant to 
follow this path for fear of wasting their own 
resources being roundly criticised. 
Second, the interviewees voice concerns about 
the fact that the inexperience of civil society 
organisations results in an inability to handle 
big projects. According to the EU officials, only 
10 to 20 NGOs in Azerbaijan have the capacity 
to manage big-scale projects effectively. They 
openly acknowledge that the EU financially 
supports a small circle of large, experienced and 
well-connected NGOs regularly and that other 
NGOs (small, less experienced and often based 
in the regions) are consequently neglected and 
excluded from EU funding.23 The EU’s approach 
to privilege the professionalised part of civil 
society (which is very small in Azerbaijan) 
tends to create or reinforce fragmentations in the 
civil society sector; the bureaucratic application 
procedures further disadvantage smaller NGOs 
without the necessary capacities. Azerbaijan is no 
exception to this tendency. Similar observations 
have been made for Ukraine (Solonenko 2010) 
and for Central and Eastern European countries 
in the accession process (Börzel 2010; Stewart 
2008). Although the interviewees express the need 
for smaller grants in order to better match the 
realities, the fact that such calls are not stipulated 
for Azerbaijan by the Commission Headquarters 
in Brussels might hinder this change. 
As in other ENP countries, project funding 
is the focus of EU assistance for civil society in 
Azerbaijan. Some scholars argue that the EU’s 
practice of solely funding projects instead of 
offering core funding and capacity building 
measures tends to prevent NGOs from “developing 
an institutional identity and projecting it to the 
broader society as well as to potential partners 
in the public and private sectors” (Stewart 2008: 
227). Moreover, this approach is limiting the 
23 One respondent appreciated that smaller NGOs can instead benefit 
from funding offered by the ‘Council of State Support to NGOs’. 
This body was set up in 2008 and is managed by a member of the 
Parliament, however, it is accused by many NGO representatives 
of not being independent (Abbasov 2010).
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sustainability of civil society efforts and instead 
reinforces the ‘business-character’ of the civil 
society sector. 
This chapter has shown the limited relevance 
of the official discourse for EU officials working 
in Azerbaijan. Their differentiated knowledge 
about the political setting and weaknesses of 
civil society does not result in a copying of the 
ambitious normative agenda nor does it entail 
an adaptation of the latter to more specific and 
tailor-made objectives. Instead, the importance of 
reforms in the area of democracy and human rights 
is downgraded. Civil society is considered a ‘sick 
patient’ rather than an agent of change that has the 
potential to contribute to the implementation of 
the ENP and the promotion of values. At the same 
time, the EU Delegation does not seem to act as 
a retributive agent between two distant levels 
(EU in Brussels and target actors in Azerbaijan), 
which could lead to a renegotiation of general and 
country-specific goals for Azerbaijan. 
III Civil society in Azerbaijan: a 
willing but critical reform partner 
In countries where political elites are veto-
players and the political opposition is weak, 
other domestic actors, notably a reform-minded 
civil society, may become relevant actors in the 
reform process initiated by the ENP (Solonenko 
2010: 13). According to the official discourse at 
least, the EU seeks to strengthen civil society and 
wants it to work as an implementing partner. The 
previous chapter has shown that EU actors only 
partially subscribe to this discourse and question 
the potential of civil society in Azerbaijan to take 
on such a role. This chapter takes an outside-in 
perspective by focusing on civil society’s views 
and attitudes. Assuming that the more civil society 
reflects and shares the EU’s political offers and 
policy goals and the better it is equipped with 
relevant (personnel and financial) resources, the 
more likely is its identification as a change agent, 
which can support the implementation of the ENP. 
Therefore, in a first step, the following chapter 
analyses how civil society assesses the political 
relations between the EU and Azerbaijan. In a 
second step it takes a closer look at how far civil 
society is able and willing to contribute to the 
implementation of the ENP. Finally, it will assess 
to what extent civil society feels empowered by 
the EU through its financial support. 
Based on interviews with leaders of civil 
society organisations in Azerbaijan, this chapter 
shows that despite being discouraged by the 
priorities currently dominating EU-Azerbaijan 
relations, the civil society in Azerbaijan shares 
the general goals of the ENP and is willing to 
act as an implementing partner. Although being 
appreciative of the funds given by the EU, civil 
society does not perceive them as a form of moral 
support and wishes more non-monetary assistance. 
Due to patchy inclusion of civil society, its role as 
reform partner is still partial and inconsistent.
The political relations between the EU and 
Azerbaijan: a relation based on oil? 
Generally, civil society in Azerbaijan sees 
the advantage of integrating into the EU and 
understands the ENP and the EaP as means 
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to do so. There are, however, highly varying 
assessments of the EU-Azerbaijan relationship 
that seem to correlate with the proximity of civil 
society organisations to the government. Whereas 
pro-governmental civil society actors mirrored the 
government’s rhetoric by affirming that the EU is a 
national priority, other more critical actors stressed 
the government’s reluctance to cooperate. While 
the political leadership is said to use official visits 
by EU leaders to strengthen its own legitimacy and 
to gladly accept technical assistance, it is described 
as being reluctant to accept financial support from 
the EU for fear of being pressured into reforms. In 
addition, the government is said to disapprove of 
the fact that the ENP, which was developed for 16 
highly different countries, is not flexible enough to 
adapt its goals to the priorities of the Azerbaijani 
government. Finally, some civil society actors 
doubt that the assumptions on which the ENP and 
the EaP are built are valid for Azerbaijan given 
that it does not need money and that it is adverse 
to influence from outside, notably in the areas of 
democracy and human rights. 
Civil society actors do not see a direct link 
between the democratisation of Azerbaijan and 
integration by means of the ENP. Instead, most 
of them see cooperation in the energy sector 
as the main focus of attention for both the EU 
and Azerbaijan. They argue that the oil money 
available to the Azerbaijani government and the 
energy-related interests of the EU and its member 
states prevent the EU from supporting the values 
that are set out in official documents. Moreover, 
the EU is blamed for making the government its 
most important partner and for being loyal to it. In 
contrast to EU officials who consider cooperation 
in the energy sector as merely one of the EU’s 
numerous priorities, civil society actors perceive 
the energy issue as the exclusive and decisive 
factor in Azerbaijan’s relations with the EU. On the 
one hand, oil is viewed as a general impediment 
to the democratisation process and a commodity 
that the country would be better off without. On 
the other hand, the EU is mainly considered an 
interest-driven actor preferring Azerbaijan as 
a reliable provider and transit country to better 
ensure its own energy security and not as an 
altruistic actor coherently promoting democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law. At the same 
time, the EU is said to permit the Azerbaijani 
government to pick the cherries from the ENP 
programme. As several civil society actors put it, 
the political leadership exclusively focuses on the 
third multilateral platform dealing with energy 
security. In this regard, some civil society actors 
blame the EU for forging shadow agreements that 
go far beyond the formal relationship. Another 
example of cherry picking concerns the EU-
Azerbaijan Human Rights Dialogue, which has 
been established much later than the dialogues 
with Armenia and Georgia. In the opinion of civil 
society, the EU is giving Azerbaijan far too loose 
a rein. However, an interesting, and for Azerbaijan 
appealing, aspect of EU assistance is seen in the 
technical support that will, according to civil 
society actors, lead to the adoption of European 
standards in Azerbaijan.
Civil society actors compare Azerbaijan to 
other countries in the region (mostly the other 
countries of the South Caucasus but also to Iran). 
Seeing the other democratisation processes in the 
region, and especially that in Georgia, as more 
successful than their own leads them to hope 
that the country‘s gas and oil reserves will run 
out soon, as they assume this will contribute to 
a paradigm change in the EU’s policy towards 
Azerbaijan. This assumption is so widespread that 
it can be classified as an oil myth.24 Moreover, and 
interestingly in line with the perceptions of the EU 
officials, civil society believes that the government 
compares itself to other countries in the region 
and is aware of the fact that if it wants to integrate 
with the EU, it must contribute and make efforts 
comparable to those of its neighbours.
Beyond criticising the priorities of both the 
EU and political leaders in Azerbaijan, civil 
society actors also have suggestions for increasing 
cooperation with the EU. In their view, the EaP 
should strive for both greater involvement of 
civil society and intensified cooperation with the 
government. Here, rather than proposing long-
term perspectives, the focus should be on short-
24 Representatives of some foreign donor organisations are more 
sceptical in this regard. In their opinion it is secondary whether 
the money comes from oil revenues or EU support. Rather, they 
assume that as long as the money is managed centrally, it will 
make the political system and the government more stable.
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term measures and concrete offers that would 
help Azerbaijan to establish strong institutions, 
rule of law, and a functioning market economy. 
Reflecting upon possible future scenarios that 
may result from Azerbaijan’s reluctance to follow 
the path proposed by the EU, some civil society 
representatives are afraid that the termination 
of cooperation with political elites and cutting 
financial assistance would lead to the isolation 
of the country and an even greater weakening of 
civil society initiatives.25 Therefore, they rather 
suggest that the EU should demand compliance 
with concrete obligations incurred by Azerbaijan 
in the Action Plan.
Overall, civil society’s view on the relations 
between the EU and Azerbaijan is very critical 
towards both actors. On the one hand, civil society 
representatives do not detect different degrees 
of willingness to cooperate on the part of their 
government, but are unanimous in identifying an 
exclusive reliance on financial independence and 
energy assets. On the other hand, they consider 
the EU a weak foreign policy actor pursuing the 
wrong priorities.
A weak implementing partner demanding 
concrete strengthening measures
Despite blaming the EU for pursuing the wrong 
priorities, civil society in Azerbaijan is nonetheless 
willing to contribute to the implementation of the 
ENP. However, as this section shows, views differ 
as to whether civil society is able to fulfil the tasks 
assigned to it by the EU and how it could improve 
its performance.
In principle, both representatives of the 
international donor community and civil society 
actors agree that the EU’s neighbourhood 
policies can only become more transparent and 
operational, and thus have an impact on domestic 
policy change, if civil society is included in 
their implementation. At the same time, there 
seems to be consensus that the weaknesses of 
the civil society sector in Azerbaijan have so far 
prevented civil society from playing the role of 
an implementing partner of the EU. First, it is 
25 This remark is especially interesting in a time where political 
developments in Belarus (in December 2010) and the 
Mediterranean countries (since early 2011) put the EU’s approach 
to the test. 
lamented that among the 30-80 active civil society 
organisations in the country, the majority is only 
concerned with reactive tasks such as monitoring 
legislation or media and giving legal advice, rather 
than proactively developing initiatives, preparing 
legislation or contributing to the implementation 
of reforms, inter alia the EU-Azerbaijan Action 
Plan. Second, a lack of publicity and media 
relations are given as reasons for the missing 
link between civil society and society at large. 
Civil society representatives unanimously regret 
this missing link, which is also mentioned by 
EU actors. They are of the opinion that unlike in 
Georgia or Ukraine, the Azerbaijani society has 
only minimal knowledge of the motives, functions 
and objectives of civil society organisations. 
Concerning the role of civil society to promote 
and implement EU policy, it is argued that the 
society in Azerbaijan also lacks information on 
the EU and consequently does not understand the 
potential role of civil society in the EU integration 
process. 
Civil society actors confirm the assessment of 
the EU officials that they are a weak implementing 
partner. They go one step further and reflect on 
how to improve their performance, with financial 
support not being seen as the only way to do so. 
The EaP Civil Society Forum, for instance, was 
assessed by all respondents as being potentially 
conducive to strengthening civil society’s role in 
the implementation of the ENP. It is moreover 
perceived as an indicator that the promotion of 
local civil society is of increasing importance for 
the EU, and that civil society is becoming a serious 
partner, even in Azerbaijan. However, several 
civil society actors criticised the selection process 
for the forum’s first meeting as non-transparent. 
The EU Delegation in Azerbaijan was accused 
of favouring those CSOs that already receive EU 
funding and of selecting pro-governmental CSO’s 
for fear of antagonising the government too much. 
Concrete recommendations to improve civil 
society’s role as implementing partner include 
a greater focus on capacity-building measures 
(inter alia grant application training and English 
courses) and advocacy work. In addition, civil 
society actors call on the EU to issue public 
statements on governmental measures that narrow 
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the space for NGOs. 
Despite the fact that civil society relies heavily 
on the EU and external assistance in general to 
improve their situation, a large majority of civil 
society actors do not perceive the EU as imposing 
an agenda and instrumentalising them for its 
own purposes. Rather, they seem to act out of a 
conviction that the general goals and principles 
promoted by the EU (not the specific issues that are 
high on the EU-Azerbaijan agenda) are attractive 
and could bring solutions to the problems faced 
under the current political leadership. At the same 
time, the activities of some human rights NGOs 
that are very critical of the government, i.e. 
monitoring of the government and giving legal 
advice on fundamental freedoms, suggest that they 
define themselves as agents of democratisation 
from inside and not only in relation to external 
stimuli.
Civil society as promoter of European rather 
than EU values
Overall, civil society does not seem to have a 
clear understanding of the causes and effects of 
democratisation or the instruments that the EU has 
at its disposal to promote democracy. Instead, civil 
society vaguely considers the EU’s presence as 
something good, while at the same time criticising 
that little has changed in recent years. Civil society 
actors see some strength, however, in formal 
agreements, even if the government does not show 
an increased eagerness to implement them. Instead, 
civil society actors assume that the government 
will have to adjust its rhetoric and actions sooner 
or later, i.e. they see the rhetorical “talking the 
EU talk” (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005: 17) 
as a first step that could lead to the internalisation 
of EU norms, a process which is often described 
as discursive adoption. Moreover, civil society 
considers formal agreements as helpful reference 
points that enable it to push for democratic policy 
change. This empowerment of civil society that 
uses the ENP towards the final goal of strengthening 
democracy can be seen as “second order effects” 
produced by the ENP (Rommens 2008).26 
26 There is a certain danger that ‘talking the EU talk’ can also lead to 
a fog of war-like discursive adoption, which would remain purely 
rhetoric and make evaluating the results of the policy even more 
difficult.
Despite the fact that the EU is not perceived 
to have the necessary moral authority to influence 
society, which continues to be ascribed to the 
government, some civil society actors argue 
that the activities of civil society are useful 
in familiarising the Azerbaijani society with 
European values and European democracy. 
Others also subscribe to the idea that they act 
as promoters of values by educating society and 
developing mutual collaboration with civil society 
organisations from the EU. A reference to or 
definition of what the specific values promoted or 
incorporated by the EU – in comparison to other 
external actors – might be, however, is missing. 
In a similar vein, the presence of international 
organisations, including the EU, the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the Council of Europe, is seen as an 
important factor. However, given that the situation 
concerning human rights and democracy has not 
considerably improved in the past five years, the 
impact of external democracy promoters, notably 
the EU, on political developments remains unclear 
to civil society actors. Interestingly, civil society 
actors recall their hope related to Azerbaijan 
joining the Council of Europe in 2001, while the 
introduction of the ENP and EaP are not mentioned 
in this context. Moreover, the open criticism of the 
last elections not meeting international standards 
by the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the U.S. 
government are emphasised without naming the 
EU. These examples show that civil society sees 
the EU as an international organisation like any 
other, if with a lower presence, and not always as 
an effective and visible agent of democratisation. 
Funding not the master key to empower civil 
society 
While civil society actors state that they would 
not be able to survive without financial assistance 
from foreign donors, they do not see funding as the 
only, or even the most important, way for the EU 
to support their work. Instead, technical assistance, 
education, joint programmes, fellowships, and 
internships in EU institutions and think tanks are 
considered equally important. On the one hand, 
they perceive the EU as a grant giver that does not 
get more deeply involved with civil society. For 
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instance, civil society actors would like the EU to 
issue public statements in support of civil society. 
Seeing that the EU acts merely as a grant giver 
leads some civil society actors to call into question 
the European Commission’s interest in (political) 
cooperation with civil society. On the other hand, 
they assess the performance of the civil society 
sector critically and blame other civil society 
organisations for not using funds effectively. 
In its role as a grant giver, the EU is compared 
to other international organisations and the 
representations of individual countries, such as 
the Council of Europe, the Norwegian Embassy, 
and the British Embassy, which were all named as 
very active grant givers in Azerbaijan. Therefore, 
in funding matters the EU is also seen as an 
international actor like any other. This is further 
enhanced by the fact that the EU (especially 
the European Commission in Brussels, but also 
the Delegation in Baku) is perceived as a rather 
distant actor by civil society and not seen as 
providing sufficient support directly or indirectly 
via public statements in favour of reform-minded 
local actors.
A lack of solidarity among civil society actors 
is another element in civil society’s assessment of 
the funding situation. Some civil society actors 
accuse others of owing their existence to foreign 
grants only. These ‘grant-eaters’ are criticised 
for not being sincerely engaged in what they 
are doing, for not working professionally, for 
misappropriating grant money, and for merely 
imitating others. This phenomenon, which is 
said to have its roots in the Soviet legacy, is 
considered a general problem of externally funded 
civil societies. It mirrors the argument made by 
EU actors that civil society is merely a business 
for domestic actors to survive financially. A low 
level of solidarity within the civil society sector 
is coupled with a high degree of fragmentation. 
Some actors see the civil society sector as divided 
into different categories (e.g. pro-governmental, 
oppositional, independent; real versus fake; 
passive versus active) and distance themselves 
from others accordingly. This situation is not 
conducive to cooperation and coalition building 
within the civil society sector, and thus impedes 
civil society from becoming a collective actor 
that can put pressure on the government.27 Scarce 
exceptions only occur in cases of urgency. 
For instance, the attempt of the Azerbaijani 
government and Parliament to impose restrictive 
amendments to the NGO law in 2009 triggered 
concerted protest by civil society and led to the 
creation of a ‘Committee to protect civil society’ 
to oppose the draft law. Finally, joint pressure by 
NGO activists and the international community led 
the Parliament to reject some of the controversial 
proposals and dilute the law (Abbasov 2010; 
USAID 2010).
Civil society has quite an ambiguous view. On 
the one hand, it is very critical of EU-Azerbaijan 
relations, which it perceives to be solely based on 
oil. This oil-based relationship is seen as the main 
obstacle for reforms and democratisation in the 
country. On the other hand, it doubts that the EU 
could take on the role of an influential promoter 
of democracy even without this obstacle. While 
largely agreeing with the EU’s policy goals, it does 
not feel adequately equipped, which somewhat 
impedes its identification with the role of an agent 
of change on behalf of the EU. Moreover, civil 
society critically perceives that in practice the 
EU is largely reducing it to grant takers. While 
acknowledging their dependence on foreign 
financial sources, civil society actors believe 
different measures (e.g. grant application training) 
are necessary to improve civil society’s absorption 
capacity and foster its empowerment. Although 
civil society is mainly willing to cooperate with 
the EU, stronger (and not only monetary) support 
will be needed to turn civil society into a reform 
partner in the implementation of the ENP. 
27 Extremely weak linkages among civil society organisations and 
a low level of inclusion in international networks represent, 
according to the CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for 
Azerbaijan, a major challenge of the Azerbaijani civil society 
(Sattarov/Faradov/Mamed-zade 2007). 
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Conclusions and recommendations
The analysis of the EU’s policy towards 
Azerbaijan and the role of civil society has shown 
how differently EU officials and local civil society 
receive, interpret, and promote official EU policy 
goals. 
First, it has been demonstrated that the EU 
discursively constructs civil society as a reform 
partner that can contribute to the achievement 
of goals set by the ENP in the EU’s Eastern 
neighbourhood. This ambitious idea is, however, 
not specified or differentiated by geographic or 
thematic implementation instruments. 
Second, the analysis of views and attitudes of 
EU officials working in Azerbaijan has suggested 
that the ambitious discourse has only limited 
relevance for the implementation of the ENP. EU 
actors’ knowledge about the political context and 
the weakness of civil society does not result in an 
innovative adaption of general goals to functional 
and tailor-made policies. Instead, policy goals and 
concepts as expressed in the formulation phase are 
downgraded to unrealisable visions or secondary 
objectives. The fact that the EU mainly neglects 
the potential of civil society to be, or to become, 
a reform partner seems to be related to the EU’s 
energy priorities and its desire to keep good and 
close relations with the Azerbaijani government. 
Third, it has been shown that civil society 
actors in Azerbaijan perceive the EU mainly as a 
donor with an administrative-technical function 
rather than a political actor and influential 
promoter of democracy that helps to empower 
civil society. Generally, the instrumentalisation of 
civil society (agent of EU foreign policy) was not 
criticised by civil society actors in Azerbaijan but 
– based on a general agreement with ENP goals 
– largely welcomed. The implementation of this 
idea is, however, seen in a more ambivalent light. 
Demands for a reorientation of EU assistance 
towards an approach focusing on capacity-
development of civil society are coupled with calls 
for a more systematic involvement of civil society 
in political processes, e.g. in the framework of the 
EaP. Given the weakness and fragmentation of the 
civil society sector, the ability of civil society to 
become the EU’s implementing partner without 
increased and adapted support from the EU seems 
limited. 
What implications do these conclusions have 
for the EU’s policy towards Azerbaijan? The 
following recommendations are based on the 
priorities and perceptions of governmental and 
societal actors in Azerbaijan and call on the EU 
to act without waiting for a change in the current 
political situation. 
The EU does not consider the Azerbaijani 
civil society as its reform partner in the area 
of democracy and human rights and thus fails 
to build on its potential. Given civil society’s 
increasing criticism towards the EU’s priorities 
and performance in its relations towards 
Azerbaijan, the EU should start rethinking its 
approach towards civil society. It should set up 
small-scale grant programmes which would better 
match the capacities of local civil society and 
focus more strongly on capacity-development 
measures. Moreover, in the context of increasing 
and violent pressure on human rights NGOs 
and political activists in spring of 2011, the EU 
should do more to systematically include civil 
society-related issues in the political dialogue 
with the government. A statement issued by the 
EU Delegation in March 2011 expressing concern 
about recent arrests of youth activists, underlining 
the EU’s support for democracy and human rights 
in Azerbaijan and calling on the government to 
ensure dialogue and cooperation with the civil 
society and international actors is a positive step 
in this direction (Delegation of the European 
Union to Azerbaijan 2011).28
According to the observations of EU 
representatives and civil society actors, the 
political leadership in Azerbaijan compares its 
performance regarding EU integration with that of 
its neighbours and competitors and demands equal 
treatment, even in the areas of democracy and 
human rights. The EU should use this tendency 
to its advantage and seek to exercise leverage 
by fostering competition among the ENP partner 
countries and thus increasing the pressure for 
28 See also the Statement by the spokesperson of the Commissioner 
for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan 
Füle, 18 April 2011, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=MEMO/11/256, last accessed 19 April 2011. 
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reforms. This could be done by a more systematic 
and open formulation of regional differences in the 
field of democracy and human rights towards the 
respective governments or by including additional 
elements – beyond the Governance Facility – 
which make assistance conditional upon progress 
made on the agreed reform agenda. This would 
reward ‘leaders’ and leave ‘laggards’ empty-
handed, as the new ‘more for more’ strategy 
of the European Commission and the High 
Representative of the European Union suggests 
(European Commission/High Representative of 
the European Union 2011).
In early 2011, the EU rewarded the signing 
of a joint declaration on gas delivery with the 
announcement of opening negotiations on a 
visa facilitation agreement with Azerbaijan 
(EURACTIV 2011). In the long term this 
political move will favour Azerbaijani citizens 
whose greater mobility could open up the current 
political system. From this point of view, the EU 
should be cautious and not give up its negotiation 
power too early but couple it with demands vis-
à-vis the government. At the same time, both 
visa facilitation and the perspective of visa free 
travel are no real incentives for the Azerbaijani 
government. Against this background, the EU 
should adapt its offers better to the respective 
partner countries in order to increase leverage.
Azerbaijan’s independence due to its large 
energy reserves is generally seen as obviating 
democratisation and compliance with reform 
suggestions, which are (too cautiously) proposed 
by the EU. Several factors, however, relativise 
the country’s independence and give the EU 
possible leverage to promote stability based 
on values. First, Azerbaijan is as interested in 
selling its resources as EU member states are 
in buying them. Moreover, given that trade 
in energy is long-term and pipelines cannot 
be changed at whim, dependence on energy 
‘partners’ increases once they have been chosen. 
Second, stability and jurisdictional reliability, 
i.e. the rule of law, including more transparent 
and democratic structures, are not only in the 
EU’s interest but also in the interest of Western 
oil industries that would like to invest in the 
country and see their investments protected by 
the state. Third, Azerbaijan’s independence is 
only true in financial terms. The openness of the 
Azerbaijani government to technical support 
from the EU in order to improve the effectiveness 
of its administration proves that it is in need 
of technical know-how which it would like to 
receive from cooperation with the EU. Against 
this background, the EU should take a stronger 
stance on democratic developments, increase 
knowledge transfer and strengthen capacity-
building measures at the administrative level.
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